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Abstract  operative  plant provide the  motivation for co-
operative  members  to  establish  arrangements
Payment  arrangements  among  members  of a  that determine  the manner in which members'
cooperative  play a critical  role in the perform-  deliveries are coordinated. In this regard, Trifon
ance  of the  cooperative.  The  impact  of three  (p. 217)  states that  "conflict willprevail over
payment  systems  is  assessed  for Florida  sugar-  phases of rapidly rising unit-costs (resulting
cane  cooperatives  through  a  bi-level  program-  from eaustion of inflexible capacty, espe-
ming model which incorporates both individual  cially under severe resource restriction)."
and collective  behavior. and  collective  behavior.  The  settlement  of  arrangements  is  condi-
Key  words:  cooperatives,  mathematical  pro-  tioned  by  the  manner  in  which  control  and
gramming,  sugarcane.  decisionmaking are shared by the members. The
internal power structure  of the cooperative can
A group of individuals with common inter-  be characterized  by three groups: the members,
ests usually attempts to further those interests.  the  board  of  directors,  and  the  management
Olson  points out that  unless  there  is  coercion  team. The dominance of one group over another
or some  type of device to make individuals act  and  of coalitions  within  the  dominant  group
in their common interests, rational self-centered  affect the  types  of arrangements  generated  ac-
individuals will not act to achieve their common  cording  to  the  interests  and  objectives  of the
group  interests.  dominant  elements.  Shaffer  addresses  some  of
A  cooperative  enterprise  is  an  organization  the complications involving alternative linkages
owned  and operated by its members which op-  between  ownership  and  control  of farmer  co-
erates  solely  for  their  benefits.  A  processing  operatives.  He  argues  that  one can  reasonably
cooperative,  which  processes  members'  raw  expect the  management  of the cooperative  to
product by altering its form,  faces the problem  be  more  responsive  to  members'  preferences
of best coordinating the deliveries of the mem-  than  in investor-owned  firms.  In  this  study,  it
bers who  may have  conflicting  interests  in the  is assumed  that payment  arrangements  are  set
operation  of the cooperative  plant.  This is  dif-,  by the dominant group, but such a group is not
ferent  than  the  case  of  vertically  integrated  explicitly identified.  In doing so, the dominant
investor-owned  firms where  the raw product is  group would set up the environment  in which
an  input  in the  production  process  and not  a  its  objective  is  best  accomplished.  The  diffi-
vehicle  of returns in itself.  One way to discern  culties involved in cooperative  decisionmaking,
the  characteristics  of cooperative  associations  in particular identification  of a cooperative  ob-
from investor-owned  firms is by considering the  jective,  are  identified  by Aresvik  and Zusman.
principles  that  govern  the  relationships  be-  In the foregoing  discussion,  questions relat-
tween a cooperative and its members. Abraham-  ing to the  nature  of the  cooperative  objective
sen  states the following principles:  (1)  service  are raised.  Ladd  (1982)  argues  that maximiza-
at cost by the cooperative,  (2) member  control  tion of total  net returns  is  the  most plausible
and ownership,  and  (3)  limited return on cap-  single  objective  for  a  cooperative  enterprise.
ital.  Helmberger and Hoos argue that the cooperative
Arrangements,  as used  in this paper,  are for-  maximizes  cooperative  surplus,  leading  to  an
mal commitments  (e.g.,  contracts)  that specify  equilibrium  given  by the  point where  net av-
how  members'  raw  product is to be marketed,  erage revenue  product from the members'  raw
that is,  establishing rules by which  net savings  product equals the supply function.of the mem-
(costs)  of the cooperative  and fixed processing  bers. LeVay and Zusman challenge the existence
capacity are allocated to the members. Conflicts  of a single, unambiguous cooperative  objective
and interdependence  in the operation  of a  co-  on the grounds that conflict of interests among
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99the  members  does  not allow an  objective  def-  total  net  returns  of the  cooperative  and  a  set
inition.  of subprograms  that  represents  the  members'
Nonetheless,  one can reasonably postulate that  problem. Management  influences members'  be-
the members'  objective  is the maximization  of  havior in the model through the pricing of fixed
their own net returns and that payment  arrange-  costs.  Variable  costs  are  exactly  allocated  to
ments significantly  affect  the behavior of mem-  each service  or delivery.  From  the analysis,  Bar
bers,  and  hence,  the  performance  of  the  suggests  that  fixed  costs  must  be allocated  in
cooperative.  The manner in which a cooperative  accordance  to  the  shadow  price  of resources
enterprise  compensates  (charges)  its  members  but concludes  that maximum cooperative  prof-
for their  contribution  to  (use  of)  the  cooper-  its  are unattainable.
ative plays a crucial role in providing incentives  Buccola and Subaei consider ex post  payment
for their collective  welfare and in determining  arrangements.  They analyze  the risk and distri-
the distribuiton of returns among the members.  butional  implications  of  alternative  product
In a processing  cooperative,  a payment  system  pooling  schemes  once  net  savings  of the  co-
allocates  cooperative  net  savings  among  the  operative  have been  determined.  They do not,
members  and  influences  decisions  on  product  however,  characterize  surplus  as  depending
quality,  size of deliveries,  and when to deliver  upon  the  payment  scheme.  Ladd  (1974),  on
the  raw  product  for  processing.  Payment  ar-  the  other  hand,  addresses  alternative  coopera-
rangements  can  be viewed  as  instruments  to-  tive objectives. Results indicates that an efficient
potentially  enhance  the  performance  of  quantity  maximizing  cooperative  differs  from
cooperatives.  Knutson  notes  that most buy-sell  an  efficient  price  maximizing  cooperative  and
cooperatives  lack  sophistication  in marketing.  both  differ  from  a  profit  maximizing  coopera-
He also states that  committed  commodity mar-  tive. Zusman concludes  that the Pareto optimal
keting cooperatives  hold  the potential  for im-  solution in a marketing cooperative  is achieved
proving  price  discovery  largely  through  through allocating cost in accordance with mar-
improved grading systems, timing of marketing,  ginal cost and allocating the remaining surplus
and  establishment  of  more  realistic  location  through side  payments.
price  differentials.  The  conclusions  of Bar,  Hardie,  and Zusman
The  objective  of this  paper  is  to  provide  a  are congruous with each other  and to the find-
methodological  framework  for  the  empirical  ings of the present  study. The model presented
assessment of alternative payment arrangements  in this paper concerns alternative ex ante rules
among members of processing  cooperatives.  An  of apportioning  cooperative  savings.  The prob-
empirical  model  is  developed  for Florida  sug-  lem is conceptualized as a bi-level programming
arcane  processing  cooperatives  and three  pay-  problem in which payment rules are set at level
ment systems are analyzed.  These payments  are  1  (by  the  dominant  group within  the  cooper-
based  on sugarcane  weight,  sugar weight,  and  ative)  and members  react  at level  2  by trying
use value of the  delivered  sugarcane.  to  maximize  their  own  net  returns  given  the
payment scheme  set at level  1. Thus, the model
PREVIOUS  WORK  is analogous to the one presented by Hardie in
the  sense  that  members'  behavior  is  differen-
Studies with similar objectives  as undertaken  tiated  from  the  behavior  of a  collective  deci-
in this  paper  include  analyses  by Bar,  Hardie,  sionmaker. Hardie's model does not incorporate
Buccola and Subaei, Ladd (1974),  and Zusman.  alternative  rules of allocating  cooperative  sur-
These studies are not primarily concerned with  plus  (or costs).  In the model  proposed  in this
payment arrangements per se and, with the ex-  paper,  the cooperative  always  strives  to maxi-
ception  of Buccola  and Subaei,  do not provide  mize total profits but the cooperative  objective
empirical  results.  embodies  the  payment  arrangement  and  the
Hardie  and  Bar  developed  linear  program-  members'  behavior.  In  addition,  the model  in-
ming  models  for  cooperatives  and  both  pre-  cludes spatio-temporal  and plant capacity  fac-
scribe efficient pricing solutions from the shadow  tors  that  affect  the  operation  of  processing
values. Hardie's model allows for various grades  cooperatives.
of raw material  and suggests pricing each prod-
uct in accordance with its shadow price.  Helm-  FLORIDA  SUGARCANE  PROCESSING
berger  et  al.  discuss  the  shortcomings  of this  COOPERATIVES
approach.  Bar  presents  a  model  based  on  the
decomposition  principle  of  linear  program-  In Florida, sugarcane processing cooperatives
ming.  The model  is composed of a master pro-  account for approximately  35% of all cane pro-
gram in which management  strives to maximize  cessed  (Zepp).  Figure  1 depicts the operation
1The  Florida sugar industry  is  located in  the southern  end of Lake  Okeechobee  and  comprises  more  than  340,000 acres
which  produced  1,121,490  short tons of raw sugar  in the  1980-81  season  (Alvarez  et al.).
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Figure 1. Flows  of Inputs, Outputs,  and Payments in Florida Sugarcane  Processing  Cooperatives.
of Florida sugarcane  cooperatives  in relation to  processing capacity. The harvest season extends
its members and other involved segments. These  from October to April when sugar accumulates
cooperatives  harvest,  haul,  and process  mem-  in the cane  (Alvarez et al.). Conflicts arise among
bers'  sugarcane and produce and sell the sugar.  the  members  because  of  the  perishability  of
These  cooperatives  pay members from  net sav-  sugarcane  (storage  cannot  be  utilized),  and
ings generated from the sales of sugar less fixed  members'  preferences  for delivery time.  These
and variable costs (harvesting,  hauling, and pro-  conflicts  are  settled,  in part,  through  the  im-
cessing).  This paper deals with rules of appor-  position of individual delivery quotas to ensure
tioning  this  surplus;  i.e.,  the  broken  line  that  adequate  deliveries  in both "good"  and "bad"
flows from the cooperative plant to the members  delivery  times within  a  processing season.
in  Figure  1.  As  is  customary  in  cooperatives,  Sugarcane cooperative members influence the
Florida  sugarcane  cooperatives  pay  an  initial  quality  and quantity  of deliveries  through  the
price  at the  time  of delivery  and  distribute  a  selection of varieties of cane,  area of cane cul-
deferred patronage  at the end of the accounting  tivated,  and  times  of deliveries.  There  are  at
period.  least five reasons for variation in the value added
Florida sugarcane  cooperatives currently  pay  generated across varieties. Varieties of cane dif-
their members according to the amount of "net  fer by (1)  tons of cane produced  per acre,  (2)
standard tons"'  of cane delivered  in an attempt  sugar  content,  (3)  fiber content,  which affects
to compensate for the amount of sugar extracted  ease of processing or time to process,  (4)  grow-
from the delivered  raw product  (Crane et al.).  ing costs, and (5)  temporal quality and tonnage
Payment  is adjusted by the average  harvest and  patterns  (Meade  and  Chen,  Miller  and James,
transportation  costs per ton of cane  delivered.  Alvarez  et  al.).
Since members  are currently paid according  to  The payment problem for a Florida sugarcane
sugar  delivered  and sugar  content  in  the cane  cooperative  is to allocate the net savings of the
increases  as  the  season  progresses  (Alvarez  et  cooperative  to the members.  The  payment  sys-
al.),  members  prefer  to  deliver  their  cane  as  tem  directly  affects  members'  behavior,  and
late  as  possible  to increase  their revenues.  hence,  affects  the level  and distribution  of net
Sugarcane  processing  cooperatives  face  the  returns among the members. The balance of this
problem of determining the best use of limited  paper consists of three parts. First, the payment
2Field  trash and cane  tops are  subtracted  from the  delivered  cane to  obtain  "net tons"  of cane.  "Standard  tons" of cane
are  net  tons of cane  adjusted  with  a quality  factor  which  is  determined  upon  analysis  of the  sucrose  content in  the  cane
juice  (Meade  and Chen).
101systems to be instituted are defined.  Then,  a bi-  under payment  system k for the delivery of the
level  programming model  is developed  for the  raw  product.  For simplicity,  it  is assumed that
problem.  Finally,  the model parameters are  es-  the  cooperative  does  not  retain  any  earnings,
timated and empirical results are presented and  or conversely,  that members  have no  liquidity
discussed.  preference  with respect  to deferred  payments.
Even  though  an  infinite  number  of  payment
PAYMENT  SYSTEMS  systems can be devised to allocate equation  (1),
three are considered which seem plausible and
Consider  a sugarcane  processing cooperative  are  commonly used  by the sugarcane  industry
composed  of m members with closed member-  (Meade  and Chen).
ship. The  cooperative  only processes members'
raw  product  and the  members  are  committed  First, consider a payment system that allocates
to  deliver  all  their production  to  the  cooper-  cooperative  surplus  based  on  tonnage  of raw
ative.  material  delivered.  The  price  per unit  of Y  is
Let  Y,, denote  the  amount  of raw  product  Py  =  CS/Y,  and  the  payment  for the  delivery
produced  from variety v (v= 1,...,V),  delivered  of Yft  is:
in processing period t (t= 1,...,T)  from  field  f 
(f= 1 ,...,Fi), belonging to member i (i = 1  ,...,m).  ()  Y,  =  P, 
Let Hv be a binary choice variable which equals  Under this payment  system, a grower's payment
one if field f belonging to member i is harvested  is  directly  proportional  to  the  tons  of  cane
in period  t, planted with variety v,  and  equals  delivered regardless of the sugar or fiber content
zero  otherwise.  Define  J  and  H  as  the  vectors  of the  cane.
containing Y,  and Hlf,  respectively.  Let Y de-
note  total raw  product  delivered  by the mem-  Second,  consider a system in which members
bers.  The  inner  product  of J  and  H  equals  Y,  are paid for the amount of sugar that is extracted
i.e.,  H *J  =  Y.  Further,  define  Y as  the vector  from  their  deliveries.  Payment  is  based  on  Z
of raw product deliveries for the planted fields  rater than on Y and a "price  can be expressed
containing  all  nonzero  cross  products  of  H  as  Pz  =  CS/Z.  The  payment for the delivery of
and Y1f.  Ytv  is:
Assume  the  cooperative  variable  cost  func- 
tion,  C(Y),  is  separable  so  that  the  cost  of  (4)  PAYft  =  Pz Zt,,
harvesting,  transporting,  and  processing  each  where  Zf  represents  the  finished  product
member's  delivery  can  be  allocated  to  that  equivalent of Yf,  i.e., the sugar extracted from
grower.  This  assumption  is  reasonable  since  y
Florida  sugarcane  cooperatives  compute  varia-  Third,  consider the case  where members  are
ble  expenses  per  ton  delivered  (harvesting,  paid  on  a  use  vale  basis,  and  thus  they  are
hauling, processing) and they record the amount  paid  for the  quantity  of sugar  extracted  from
of raw  material  and variety  contained  in each  their  deliveries  adjusted  for  the  cost  of pro-
delivery.  Let  Z,  Ps  ,  and  FCC  denote  the  total  cessing  and  other  cooperative  services.  Thus,
amount  of sugar produced by the cooperative,  payment for the delivery of Y~  is:
the price at which the cooperative  sells  Z, and
the fixed cooperative  cost, respectively. 3 Then,  (5)  PAY3ft  =  Pz Zit  - C(Yft)  - FCCV,
cooperative  surplus  (CS),  the  net cooperative  i 
saving available  for members'  payment,  is:  wted  to  delivery  of  Y. cooperative  cost  al-
located  to  delivery  of Yv. Fixed  cooperative
(1)  CS  =  Pz  Z  - C(Y)  - FCC.  costs  can be allocated  in several ways.  Sharing
FCC  based  on  the  amount  of raw  material  is
The payment problem for  one  criterion.  In  Bar's model,  the cooperative  con-
cerns  the  allocation  of cooperative  surplus  asences  members  through  the  allocation  of
defined  in  equation  (1)  among the  members.  influences  members  through  the  allocation  of defined  in  equation  (1),  among the  members.  Following  usman,  it  is  assumed fixed  costs. Following  Zusman,  it  is  assumed Because of the nonprofit  nature of cooperative  is p  ed that every  member's share  of FCC  is predeter- associations, CS is entirely returned to the mem- 
mined,  although  Zusman's analysis would  sug- bers.  Thus,  the  following  payment  constraint  mined,  although  Zusman's  analysis would  sug-
must  hold:  gest that no equilibrium vote exists to allocate
FCC.  Note that under this payment  system, the
(2)  CS  =  PAYI,  value of marginal product that the cooperative
i  realizes is precisely the payment that the grower
where  PAY}  denotes  the  payment  to  grower  i  receives  for that delivery.
3In this paper, sugar is considered  as the sole output of sugar production,  although molasses and bagasse are  by-products
of sugar production.  This  paper  also abstracts  from  rotational  issues  by assuming  that all  cane  is  in the  second  (average)
year  of crop  cycle. Crane  et al.  address the  issues  involved  in rotation  and stubble replacement.
102A  MATHEMATICAL  PROGRAMMING  bers  are  trying  to maximize  their  own  net re-
MODEL  turns.  Individual  members  choose  which field
(area)  to plant and select the varieties planted. Given  a  payment system  to  allocate  cooper-eties  planted.
ative  surplus  among  the  members,  a member  The  cooperative  is  responsible  for  harvesting
the  fields  planted  in  the  "best"  possible  se- decides  what  variety  to  plant  in  a  given  fieldd  n  the  best"  possible  se- quence.  The decision to plant a particular field, of sugarcane since different varieties will result  q  l  l  l and hence make it available  for harvest,  is con- in different  net  returns  under  alternative  pay-  en  me  fr  h  t  is 
ment systems.  In addition,  the schedule  of de-  ti  upon members  valuation  of deliveries which depends on the prevalent payment system liveries depends on the payment system because  w  deends on te  peaent  pyent system
tonnage,  sugar,  and other  factors  embodied  in  and  grower's  cost  in  equation  (6).  Thus,  the
alternative  payment  systems  are  linked  to  the  objective contribution of each delivery is given alternative  payment  systems  are  linked  to  the
time of delivery.  by  equation  (6),  as  viewed  by  the  member. time of delivery. Further, Lopez and Spreen have shown that when
members behave as price takers, a solution anal-
ogous to that of Helmberger  and Hoos is found
Variety  Selection  Problem  when  one  maximizes  members'  total  net  re-
The problem of variety selection can be viewed  turns.  Given  the added  dimensions  of quality,
-as one of choosing among alternative techniques  space,  and  time,  cooperative  equilibrium  de-
of production.  Assume  that  the  time  span  for  pends upon the prevalent payment  system.  Re-
decisionmaking  allows  for the  selection of va-  gardless  of the  payment  system,  "fairness"  in
rieties  of sugarcane for the fields to be planted.  use  of  the  cooperative  processing  plant  over
The characteristics  that determine yields,  costs,  the processing  season  is  achieved  through  in-
and processing-capacity  use are unique to each  dividual  delivery  quotas based  on the  amount
field of sugarcane  (usually  40 acres).  of raw  product.
In deciding which variety to plant in a given  Three  sets of constraints  that  regulate  oper-
field (f) for deliveries in a particular processing  ation  of  a  sugarcane  cooperative  in  a  given
period (t), a member  (i) will strive to maximize  processing season are processing plant capacity,
members' delivery quotas, and the payment con-
(6)  NRft,  =  PAYi  t-  GCi,,  straint (no deferred payments  or taxes). 4 There
are two limits  that define  processing  plant ca-
where NRk^  and  PAYkf  are net returns and pay-  pacity:  a  lower  limit  (Ml)  which  specifies  the
ment to the grower under payment system k for  minimum  amount  of  cane  that  justifies  eco-
deliveries  of  Yf.  GCif  is  the  grower's  cost  nomic operation of the mill and an upper limit
incurred  in producing Yv. Furthermore,  equa-  (Mt)  which specifies the maximum amount that
tion  (6)  gives  the valuation  of deliveries from  can be processed  in a  given period.  Members'
the  member's  standpoint;  i.e.,  how  much  that  delivery  quotas  are  imposed  to  induce  "fair-
delivery  is worth  to the  grower.  For  instance,  ness"  in using the processing  plant in "good"
if  the  payment  is  based  on  raw  product,  the  and  "bad"  delivery periods.  A member's deliv-
grower will be concerned only with the amount  ery in each processing period must be contained
of raw product  at delivery time.  between the upper quota, Qt, and lower quota,
When  payment  is  based  on  use  value,  the  Qit,  for period  t.  The  quotas  are  used  in  the
payment  for  Ylf  is  the  value  added  from  the  model  without  questioning  the  implication  of
delivery. When balanced with the grower's cost  alternative  supply  control policies.
as  in equation  (6),  this  payment  system  leads  Assuming that the cooperative  objective  is to
to a  production  decision  analogous  to Olson's  maximize  total net  returns  under a  given pay-
condition for the optimal amount of a collective  ment  system,  the task  of the  cooperative  is to
good  (costs  and  benefits  shared  in  the  same  maximize:
proportion),  Zusman's marginal cost pricing  in  T 
a  marketing  cooperative,  or  to  the  member's  )  To  Members'  Prof-
internalization of the marginal revenue product  i  f  t
for  a  "coordinated"  cooperative  as  suggested  subject  to:
by Lopez  and Spreen.  (8)  Ml  < E  Wift  <  Mu  Mill  Capacity
i  f
Cooperative  Maximization  Problem 
(9)  Qlt  < ZW,  <Qit  Members'  Quotas
In the present analysis, it is assumed  that the  f
task of the cooperative  is to maximize  total net  (10)  E  PAY'  - CS=0  Payment  Constraint
returns of the members provided that the mem-  i
4 Individual  member  quotas  can  be  defined such  that their sum  equals  mill  capacity  in a  particular harvest period.  The
model formulation,  however,  includes both  mill  capacity  and members'  quotas  for completeness.
103(11)  NRkf  =  Max  NRkft  Variety  Selection  tion is  adjusted  for varietal  processing  quality
v  (fiber content)  with indices  obtained  from the
where Wif  is a binary choice variable such that  survey.  FCC  is estimated  as  the  daily mill  ca-
Wft equals one if field f of member i is harvested  pacity  in tons  times the  fixed  cost per  ton as
in time  t,  and  is equal  to zero,  otherwise.5 If  estimated  by the  United  States  Department  of
E  Wft is zero, that field is left idle. For payment  Agriculture.  Grower's cost per acre is estimated
t  from secondary data (USDA) and is adjusted with
based on raw or finished product, esuation (10)  growing cost indices for varieties of cane. Lopez
can  be written  as  P  = CS/Y  and  P,  CS/Z,  re-  presents  a  more  detailed discussion  on the  es- can  be written  as  Py=CS/Y  and  P,=CS/Z,  re-  Pmto  o  th  p  e  of  the  e
spectively.  For  a  use  value  payment  system,  timation  of  the  parameters  of  the  sugarcane
equation  (7)  must be adjusted  for fixed coop-  cooperative  for  which  the  model  was  opera-
erative  costs to  obtain  the total  members'  net  tionalize
returns.  FCC  is assumed  to be shared  in a  pre-
determined  manner,  and hence,  it does not in-
fluence  production  decisions.  The  nested  METHODOLOGY
optimization  in equation  (11)  determines  the  The  multilevel  programming  approach  dis-
valuation of deliveries from the members' stand-  cussed  by Candler et  al.  is analytically  appro-
point and corresponds  to the problem  given in  priate  for  the  solution  of  the  mathematical
equation  (6).  programming  problem  given by equations  (7)
through  (11).  The  problem  can  be  concep-
tualized as a bi-level  programming problem:  at
ESTIMATION  OF  PARAME  S  level  1,  arrangements  for payments  (policies)
ESTIMATION  OF PARAETRS  are set where the cooperative's  objective  is the
The  parameters  of the  stated  mathematical  maximization  of total net returns  and,  at level
programming  problem are estimated  for a sug-  2,  a  member  makes  production  decisions  to
arcane  cooperative  operating  in  South  Florida.  maximize net returns taking policies set at level
Primary data were collected to estimate Zf  and  1 and other  members'  actions  as given.
Y,  with statistical models similar to those spec-  Figure  2  shows the  five-step  algorithm  used
ified by Alvarez  et al.  Predicted Z,  and Yi,  are  to solve the bi-level programming problem. Step
used  directly in the  estimation  of cooperative  1 is  to specify  a  payment  system.  Step  2  is to
surplus and the specification of the constraints  specify  an  initial  "price"  for members'  deliv-
of the model. The processing season  is divided  eries.  At  step  3,  a nested  optimization  is  per-
into  five  harvest  periods  (T=5),  each  encom-  formed  in  which  the  variety  that  yields  the
passing  4  weeks,  within  which  the  individual  highest net return under a given payment system
members'  quotas  and  mill  capacity  were  de-  is  determined  for  each  field  harvested  during
fined.  The  cooperative  under  study  processed  each processing period.  Step  3, then, simulates
sugarcane  from  800  fields  with  a  daily  pro-  a  second  level  decision  (members'  behavior)
cessing capacity of 7,140 tons of cane operating  where  the  valuation  of  deliveries  (objective
140 days (200,000 tons per processing period).  contribution)  is determined.  Once  assignment
The  cooperative  is  assumed  to  consist  of  five  of varieties  is  determined,  step  4  consists  of
members  (m =5),  each  owning  160  fields  determining  the  planting  and  harvesting  pat-
(Fl= 160).  The  five  most  frequent  varieties  terns that maximize  total net returns given the
(planted  in 98  percent  of fields  in the  1979-  quotas and limited processing  capacity.
80  processing  season)  are  selected  as  the  va-  After step  4 is completed,  members'  price  is
rieties available to a grower  (v=A, B,  C,  D, and  computed and compared  to the price specified
E).  at step  2.  If the two  prices are  equal,  the  co-
All prices and costs are adjusted to December  operative  is in equilibrium  and total payments
1981 dollars. Cooperative costs incurred in har-  are  equal  to  cooperative  surplus.  If not,  the
vesting,  transporting,  and processing  the  cane  algorithm returns to step 2 and calibrates "price"
are  assumed  to be  linear  in raw product.  The  toward convergence of both prices. By construc-
per unit  costs were  obtained  from  budget fig-  tion,  the  use  value  payment  system  does  not
ures. A survey was conducted to obtain indices  require iterations to achieve price convergence.
for  the  processing  and  growing  costs  for  the  In the case of nonlinear processing cost function
sugarcane  varieties.  The  processing  cost func-  or endogenous  fixed cooperative cost shares, an
'Since  the  decision variables  (Wi,)  represent  fields,  member  quotas  and mill capacity  restrictions must  be expressed  in
terms of field rather than tons of sugarcane.  To ensure  feasibility of the solution,' the model is solved using an initial estimate
of member  quotas  and mill capacity  restrictions based  upon fields.  Next, the  tonnage  processed for  each  member in each
processing  period  is computed.  If these  values  are  outside  either  member  quotas  or  mill  capacity  expressed  in  tons  of
sugarcane, the bounds based on fields are  calibrated and the model is resolved. The procedure  is repeated until the solution
is  feasible  on an actual  tonnage basis.
1041.  Select  a  Payment  System.
2.  Initialize  "Price"  or Payment  to a  Adjust  "Price"  Toward
Field.  Convergence  of  2  and  5.
3.  Based Upon  2,  Select  the  Cane
Variety  that Yields  the Highest Net
Returns  to a  Field for a  Given
Processing Period.
4.  Based  Upon  3,  Maximize  Total
Members'  Net  Returns  Subject to
Capacity  and Quota  Constraints,  by
Choosing  Which  Fields to Plant
and by Harvesting Those  Fields  in
the  "best"  Possible Sequence.
5.  Compute  Generated  "Price."  Is 
this Price  Euqal  to the Price  of 
Step  2;  i.e.,  Do  Payments  Equal
Cooperative  Surplus?  YES
Figure  2.  Solution  Procedure  for the  Mathematical  Programming Model.
iterative  scheme would be needed to obtain an  network flow algorithms rather than alternative
equilibrium.  solution techniques. The  specific adaptation  of
The  algorithm  is completed  for each  of the  the above problem to a network flow framework
payment  systems.  Members'  profits  are  com-  is  explained by Lopez.
pared and the payment system that yields high-
est  total  members'  profits  is  designated  as
potentially  Pareto  superior  relative  to  another  EMPIRICAL  RESULTS EMPIRICAL  RESULTS payment  system.
The  procedure  embodies  optimization  sub-  The bi-level programming problem was solved
problems at steps  3 and 4.  Optimization at step  with the three payment  systems defined above.
3  is  computationally  trivial  since  it  only  in-  Performance  measures for each of the payment
volves  choosing  among  five  alternative  (vari-  systems  are  presented  in  Table  1.  Differences
eties)  for  each  field  in  a  given  period.  The  in  performance  results  are  due  to  differences
problem  at step  4  is  an  integer  programming  in the pattern of deliveries, varieties grown and
problem  (Wft integer)  and use  of the simplex  area of cane  planted by the  members.
method will  not  ensure  integer  solution.  The  Under  a  use  value  payment  system,  the  co-
problem can be viewed as an assignment prob-  operative  makes total net returns of $4,271,419
lem  (assigning  fields  to  processing  periods)  for  a  single  processing  season,  the  highest  of
which can be formulated as an equivalent trans-  all the scenarios  considered,  Table  1.  Payment
portation problem. Bradley et al. show that any  based  on  sugar  delivered  ranked  second  with
capacitated  transshipment  problem,  of which  total  net  returns  of  $2,304,719  which  repre-
the  transportation  problem  is  a  special  case,  sents  a  loss  of $1,966,700  from the  use value
can  be  expressed  as  a  network  flow  problem.  payment system solution. Payment based on the
They  show  that  computation  time  can  be  re-  amount  of raw  product  results  in  $2,251,238
duced  up  to  200  times  by  using  specialized  total  net  returns,  which  represents  a  loss  of
105TABLE  1.  RESULTS  OF  PERFORMANCE  MEASURES  FOR  ALTERNATIVE  While  a use value payment  system induces  the
PAYMENT  SYSTEMS  FOR  FLORIDA  SUGARCANE  COOPERATIVES  m 
members to individually bear the costs and rev-
Payment based on  enues that the cooperative realizes,  it also leads
Performance  Finihed  to a selection of differing cane varieties (variety
measure  Raw product  product  Use  value B  is planted only with  the use value payment)
Net  returns  ($)  and  to  more  efficient  harvesting  and  planting
Total...................  2,251,238  2,304,719  4,271,419  schedules.  Payment  systems  result  in different
Member  1...447,420  395,707  671244  patterns of deliveries throughout the processing
Member  2  .........  277,892  341,602  795,679  season  (mill  loads  and  sugar  production  per
Member  3  .........  440,081  545,957  1,077,546  period).
Member  4 .........  159,580  105,611  355,661  In Member  .........  926,265  105,611  355661  I  general,  the results  are  consistent  with  a Member  5  .........  926,265  915,842  1,371,419
Py  ($/ton)  ............  17.00a  17.08  20.23  priori  expectations.  A question arises as to why
p, ($/ton)  ...........  174.95a  175.34  208.76  a  use  value  payment  system  has  not  been
Tons  of sugarcane  908,153  906,863  974,172
Tons  of sugar  .......  88,273  88,326  94,390  adopted. The answer seems to lie in the conflict
Varieties of cane  ...  C  C  C,B  of  interests  involved  and  the  potentially  high
Acres  of cane  ........  24,960  24,896  25,024  costs of monitoring such a system. In this analy-
aThese  are equilibrium prices in their respective payment  sis,  it  is  assumed  the  cooperative  consisted  of
arrangements.  five  members  of similar  size.  The  five-member
assumption is  employed to simplify the dimen-
$2,020,181  from  the  use value  payment  solu-  sions of the empirical model, although it makes
tion.  Focusing  on  individual  members,  some  the results somewhat limited. Zusman has shown
members  benefited  positively with  cane-based  that as members become more divergent in size,
payment rather than with sugar-based  payment  conflicts  are  more  likely.  Implementation  of a
and vice versa. For example, member 3 is better  use  value  payment  system  would  imply  some
off with sugar-based  payment  than with  cane-  arbitrariness  in  allocating  costs.  For  instance,
based payment by  $105,876,  while  member  4  would a member located at some distance  from
is  better  off  with  cane-based  payment  by  the plant be willing to pay higher transportation
$53,969.  The  redistributional  impact  among  costs?
alternative  payment  arrangements  is  not  sur-  The  use  of  quotas  throughout  the  payment
prising  since  individual  members  have  com-  scenarios insured more even distribution of net
parative advantages in producing cane or sugar.  returns  (Lopez).  In  spite  of  these  limitations,
However,  each  member  is  better  off  under  a  the  results  support the  case  for  a  strong  man-
use  value  payment  system  than  in  any  other  agement  or  board  of  directors  to  implement
system.  rules  that  coerce  members  into  producing  ef-
The  difference  in  total  net  returns  between  ficiently.  This  is  also  supportive  of  Hobbes'
cane-based and sugar-based payments is $53,481  theory  that  states  that  one  way  to  insure  the
which is not as large as one could expect. Two  preferred  outcome is to establish a government
reasons  are  envisioned  to provide,  in part,  an  (management  or  board  of directors)  with  suf-
explanation  for the phenomenon.  First, the va-  ficient power to ensure that it is  in every man's
riety-choice  set  used  in  the  estimated  model  interest to choose  the preferred  outcome.
may  not  allow  a  large  variation  in  quantity-
quality  choice.  Second,  the  amount  of sugar
may not be independent of the amount of cane.  CONCLUDING  REMARKS
Since  cooperative  revenues  depend  on  sugar,
while cooperative variable costs depend on cane  The  purpose  of this  paper  is  to  assess  the
tonnage,  under a cane-based or sugar-based pay-  impact of alternative  payment arrangements  on
ment system,  highly productive  growers  (high  the  performance  of  Florida  sugarcane  pro-
sugar content, low cane tonnage)  are penalized  cessing  cooperatives.  A  bi-level  mathematical
for their  deliveries  which in turn  leads to  un-  programming model  is developed for the prob-
derproduction as in the case of externalities.  A  lem. The empirical results indicate that by using
use value  payment  system  leads to the  highest  a payment based on use value of the deliveries,
raw  product  price  (Py  =  20.23),  the  greatest  a  cooperative  can  significantly  increase  mem-
amount of raw product (974,172  tons of cane)  bers'  total net returns  when  compared  to  pay-
and the greatest amount of sugar (94,390 tons).  ment  based on raw  or finished product.
The differences between total net returns with  As  for the manner in which Florida sugarcane
a  use value  payment system  and  the other  sys-  cooperatives are currently operating, the results
tems show the importance of the internalization  suggest that these cooperatives  should devise  a
of the  cooperative  processing  costs  and  reve-  payment  system that  charges each  member for
nues  by  individual  cooperative  members.  The  the cost of processing deliveries.  Such a charge
difference  among  payment  systems  lies  in the  must be based on tonnage of sugarcane adjusted
valuation  of deliveries  made  by the  members.  for  processing  quality  of  the  deliveries.  This
106measure  is likely  to enhance  the  performance  low implementation  costs  regardless  of the  in-
of these cooperatives.  centives  transmitted  to  the  members.  Another
An important limitation of the analysis is that  limitation of the model  is its nonstochastic  na-
it ignores the monitoring and enforcement  costs  ture.  Risk  considerations  such  as  freeze  toler-
of the various payment arrangements.  The mag-  ance  of the  varieties  of cane  are  factors  that
nitude  of these  costs could result  in  a second-  growers  incorporate  in  their  variety  selection
best solution with a payment arrangement with  decisions.
REFERENCES
Abrahamsen,  M.  A.  Cooperative Business Enterprise, New York:  McGraw-Hill,  1976.
Aresvik,  O.  "Comments  on  'Economic  Nature  of the  Cooperative  Association."'  J.  Farm Econ.,
37(1955):140-144.
Alvarez,  J.,  D.  R.  Crane,  T.  H.  Spreen,  and  G.  Kidder.  "A  Yield  Prediction  Model  for  Florida
Sugarcane."  Agr.  Systems,  9(1982):161-179.
Bar, J.  "A Mathematical  Model  of a Village  Cooperative  Based on  the Decomposition  Principle  of
Linear  Programming."  Amer. J.  Agr.  Econ., 57(1975):353-357.
Bradley,  G.  H.,  G.  G.  Brown, and G.  W.  Graves.  "Design and Implementation  of Large  Scale Primal
Transshipment  Algorithms."  Management Science,  24(1977):1-34.
Buccola,  S. and  A.  Subaei.  "Optimal  Market  Pools  and  Cooperative  Income  Distribution  Policy."
Selected  paper presented  at the American  Agricultural  Economics Association  Meetings,  West
Lafayette,  Indiana, July  31-August  3,  1983.
Candler,  W.,  J.  Fortuny-Amat,  and  B.  McCarl.  "The  Potential  Role  of Multilevel  Programming  in
Agricultural  Economics."  Amer. J.  Agr. Econ.,  63(1981):521-531.
Crane,  D.  R.,  T.  H.  Spreen,  J.  Alvarez,  and  G.  Kidder.  "An  Analysis  of the  Stubble  Replacement
Decision for Florida Sugarcane  Growers."  Florida Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin 822,
1982.
Hardie,  I. W.  "Shadow Prices as Member Returns for a Marketing Cooperative."  Amer. J. Agr. Econ.,
51(1969):818-823.
Helmberger, P. G., G. R. Campbell, and W. D. Dobson. "Organization and Performance of Agricultural
Markets."  In  A  Survey  of Agricultural Economics Literature,  Vol.  3.  Lee  R.  Martin,  ed.
University of Minnesota  Press,  1977.
Helmberger,  D.  and  S. Hoos.  "Cooperative  Enterprise  and  Organization  Theory."  J.  Farm Econ.,
44(1962):275-290.
Hobbes,  T. Leviathan. W.  G.  Posson  Smith,  ed.  Oxford:  Clarendon  Press,  1909.
Knutson,  R.  D.  "The Impact  of Cooperatives  on Market  Performance,  Subsector  Coordination  and
the  Organization  of Agriculture."  In  Agricultural Cooperatives and the Public Interest. B.
W.  Marion,  ed.  North  Central  Project  117,  Monograph  4,  1978.
Ladd,  G. W.  "A Model  of a  Bargaining  Cooperative."  Amer. J. Agr.  Econ., 56(1974):509-519.
Ladd,  G.  W.  "The  Objective  of the  Cooperative Association."  In Development and Application of
Cooperative Theory  and Measurement of Performance.  U.S.  Department  of  Agriculture,
Agricultural  Cooperative  Service,  Staff  Report,  1982.
LeVay,  C.  "Agricultural  Co-operative  Theory:  A Review."  J. Agr. Econ.,  34(1983):1-44.
Lopez,  R.  A.  "The  Impact of Alternative  Marketing Arrangements  on the Performance  of Processing
Cooperatives."  Ph.D.  dissertation,  University  of Florida,  1983.
Lopez,  R.  A.  and T.  H.  Spreen.  "A Conceptual Analysis  of Processing  Cooperatives."  Selected paper
presented at the American Agricultural Economics Association Meetings, West Lafayette,  Indiana,
July  31-  August  3,  1983.
Meade,  G.  P.  and J.  C.  P.  Chen.  Cane Sugar Handbook, 10th ed.,  New York: John Wiley and  Sons,
1977.
Miller,  J.  D.  and N.  I.  James.  "Maturity  of Six  Sugarcane  Varieties  in Florida."  Proceedings of the
American Society of Sugarcane Technologists, 7(1978):107-111.
Olson,  M.  The Logic of Collective Action,  Harvard  University  Press,  1965.
Shaffer, J. D. "On the Ownership and Control of Farmer Cooperatives."  In Agricultural  Cooperatives
and the Public Interest. B.  W.  Marion,  ed.  North  Central Project  117,  Monograph  4,  1978.
Trifon,  R.  "The  Economics  of  Cooperative  Ventures-Further  Comments."  J.  Farm  Econ.,
43(1961):215-235.
U.S.  Department  of Agriculture.  Cost of Producing and Processing  Sugarcane and Sugarbeets in
the United States,  Economics  and Statistics  Service,  ESS  Staff  Report AGE55810421,  1981.
Zepp,  G.  "The Florida Sugar Industry:  Its Past,  Present and Future  Prospect."  Sugar and Sweetness
Report. U.S.  Department  of Agriculture,  1(1976):45-50.
Zusman,  P.  "Group  Choice  in an  Agricultural  Marketing  Cooperative."  The  Canadian  J.  Econ.,
15(1982):220-234.
107108